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THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, LEGAL PAPERS, VOLUME 3: THE FEDERAL PRACI'ICE. Andrew J. King 1 editor. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of
New England. 1989. Pp. xxxi, 1098. $110.00.
James W. Ely, Jr. 2

Daniel Webster's long and distinguished legal career has been
chronicled by numerous scholars.3 Appearing before the Supreme
Court in about two hundred cases, Webster did much to shape constitutional thought in the antebellum era. Few would dispute Webster's place among the foremost legal advocates in American
history.
Ably edited by Professor Andrew J. King, The Papers of
Daniel Webster: The Federal Practice offers a new perspective on
Webster's achievements. Encompassing both private and constitutional litigation, this volume contains a wealth of material concerning Webster's participation in federal litigation between his first
Supreme Court argument in an 1814 prize case and his last case
shortly before his death in 1852. To illustrate Webster's career
King has assembled an impressive array of judicial arguments, correspondence, pleadings, notes on the arguments of opposing counsel, opinion letters, and legislative reports. These materials are
arranged topically into chapters concerning Webster's participation
in major cases or discrete fields of law, and chronologically within
each chapter. Insightful editorial notes help readers to understand
the documents in historical context. The volume, published in two
parts, includes extensive treatment of Webster's role in such
landmark decisions as Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge
(1837). But the work also provides a valuable study of Webster's
wide-ranging private law practice, covering maritime litigation, patent infringement cases, disputes over waterpower, and land title
controversies. Helpful appendices catalogue each of Webster's appearances before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
Webster's constitutional advocacy surely interests the widest
range of scholars today. Property rights were central to Webster's
constitutionalism. Although influenced by tactical considerations
I. Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
2. Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. Co-editor of LEGAL PAPERS
OF ANDREW JACKSON (with T. Brown) (1987).
3. E.g., M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SUPREME COURT (1966); F. STITES,
PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC GAIN: THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE (1972).
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in particular cases, he consistently championed the rights of property owners against legislative control. Mirroring the values of the
framers, Webster linked political liberty and protection of private
property. "(N]ext to life, & liberty," he observed in his Dartmouth
College brief, "the great end of free government is to keep hands off
private property."
Along with his high regard for property rights, Webster harbored deep suspicion of state legislatures. "If at this period there is
not a general restraint on legislatures, in favour of private rights,"
he argued in an 1829 land title dispute, "there is an end to private
property." As this argument suggests, Webster's nationalism was
largely instrumental: He endeavored to strengthen national power
as a shield against state infringement of property rights. More specifically, Webster successfully sought to fashion the contract clause
and the commerce clause into significant limits on state power over
economic affairs.
Webster was especially well-attuned to the property-conscious
Marshall Court. He was clearly less comfortable with the Jacksonian bent of the Court once Roger B. Taney became Chief Justice in
1836. "The present Judges, I fear," Webster complained in 1847,
"are quite too much inclined to find apologies for irregular & dangerous acts of State Legislative." Notwithstanding this foreboding,
he continued to enjoy influence before the high court. For instance,
Webster successfully urged upon the Taney Court a broad view of
federal admiralty jurisdiction over maritime contracts of carriage.
Aside from such weighty constitutional issues, the volume
casts revealing light on the more practical aspects of Webster's federal court practice. The documents show him formulating litigation
strategy, handling clients, commenting on the arguments of opposing counsel, and offering his appraisal of various justices. Webster
frequently represented commercial interests and corporations. Following his success in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), he represented
the second Bank of the United States during the 1820s. He served
as counsel for several railroads in Massachusetts, as well as the Boston Manufacturing Company. Likewise, insurance companies
turned to Webster for legal advice.
Particularly welcome is this book's attention to Webster's private law practice. This aspect of his career is often obscured by the
more famous constitutional cases. Technology was a driving force
in the transformation of American society during the 19th century.
In sympathy with this technological revolution, Webster viewed
patent protection as a means of inducing investment and encouraging inventions. Consequently, he frequently sought to enforce pat-
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ents in the lower federal courts in New England. Webster was also
active in disputes over land ownership and inheritance rights, arguing many such cases before the Supreme Court under diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction.
The financial dimensions of practice were never far from Webster's mind. From his early request of a $1000 fee in Dartmouth
College, Webster was never modest in estimating his value. He frequently negotiated with clients concerning fees, and occasionally experienced difficulty collecting his compensation. Webster pressed
vigorously in 1827 to receive payment for his services in a case to
recover a lottery prize. In view of the complexity of the Passenger
Cases (1849), Webster suggested that "an enlarged contingency"
would be in order. Indeed, he subsequently entered into a contingency fee arrangement under which he received 25% of any tax
rebates received by his clients. Little wonder that one aggravated
client observed: "Webster like all the Lawyers is unreasonable in
relation to Money Matters."
Despite a large measure of self-confidence, Webster did not allow his role as an advocate to distort his assessment of the likely
outcome of cases. Pessimistic about the prospect of success in
Charles River Bridge, Webster urged his client to consider a negotiated settlement. Although he attacked state liquor regulations in
the License Cases ( 1847), he correctly predicted that the Supreme
Court would uphold the laws.
Webster enjoyed informal access to several Supreme Court justices. He corresponded regularly with Joseph Story on matters of
general legal interest as well as legislation pending in Congress. At
times this correspondence touched upon national events. While
Webster was Secretary of State, for instance, Story strongly recommended that Webster push President John Tyler to take steps
against the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island. R. Kent Newmyer has
characterized this close collaboration between Webster and Story
"as one of the most extraordinary in American law and politics."4
Even more remarkably, Webster wrote John McLean requesting information about the outcome of the Passenger Cases. Breaching judicial confidentiality, McLean gave private assurances that "there
will be a right decision." This exchange, highly questionable to
modem eyes, reflects the casual standards of a less fastidious age.
The volume also documents the close relationship between
Webster's legal practice and his political career. As chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee during the 1820s Webster worked to
4.
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strengthen the federal judiciary as a bulwark for property interests.
He favored reorganization of the judiciary, and the creation of separate circuit courts of appeal. Although this reform failed, Webster
helped defeat legislative moves to restrict the authority of the
Supreme Court to invalidate state laws. More profitably, he crafted
portions of the Federal Crimes Act of 1825 to close gaps in the
existing law. Webster's attempts to revamp federal judicial power
were fueled by his distrust of the state courts. "From the state
Courts nothing can be expected," he observed in 1823. "The vacillating policy of our little petty states, leading to such frequent
changes, in the organization of their Courts, & more frequent
changes of the judges, forbids all hope of system, or consistency in
adjudications."
Political ambitions took a toll on Webster's practice. Busy in
the Senate and planning a presidential race, in the 1830s Webster
began to curtail his Supreme Court work. Litigants, however, continued to seek his assistance. Indeed, Webster's professional
achievements are particularly striking in view of his pressing public
commitments. He appears to have been a driven man. William
Wirt, a prominent contemporary at the Supreme Court bar, privately declared: "Webster is as ambitious as Caesar. He will not be
outdone by any man."
I was disappointed by the absence of material on Webster's
participation in Wheaton v. Peters (1834), the first copyright case
heard by the Supreme Court. Wheaton was pivotal in shaping the
evolution of intellectual property law in the new nation. The editor
concluded that only fragmentary papers relating to this case survived. This decision seems questionable. A recent study of the
Wheaton litigation indicates the availability of several important
documents that bear on Webster's role. Of particular interest is the
interplay between Webster and his client Wheaton, a noted legal
scholar.5
Nonetheless, scholars will find much of interest in this work.
It reveals a good deal about Webster and the development of American law during the antebellum years. It is an outstanding scholarly
achievement which deserves a wide audience.
5. For a fine treatment of Wheaton v. Peters, see Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme
Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1291, 1351-86 (1985).

